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The definition of “confidential information” is often
very wide, in many cases wider than is what would normally be thought
of as confidential. The key to the drafting of the NDA is the scope
of the exceptions and this is the area for a buyer to focus upon.
In some respects there is a community of interests between the buyer
and seller in relation to the exceptions as an overly restrictive
NDA is potentially an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore
void and unenforceable. Information in the public domain is a clear
exception to the definition of confidential information.
The buyer should also exclude from the definition of confidential
information, information which is in its possession or comes into
its possession otherwise than from the seller. Ideally the NDA will
not impose a burden of proof obligation on the buyer.
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A key exception for a buyer is that they be permitted to disclose
confidential information to the extent required by law. Most buyers
will wish to extend the definition of law to cover the rules of
any regulatory body binding upon the buyer. An obvious example of
a regulatory body would be the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
which may not always be strictly binding in law but is always effectively
legally binding as a matter of practice.
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Buyers may wish to consider being permitted to disclose confidential
information if they “reasonably believe” that disclosure
is required by law or the rules of any regulatory body. Without
the wording regarding reasonable belief the buyer must be absolutely
certain that its disclosure is required. If it is subsequently proven
that disclosure was not required then there will have been a breach
of the NDA with potential damages. If necessary a buyer might agree
to mitigate the effect of the reasonable belief wording by including
references to opinions from counsel or solicitors supporting their
reasonable belief.
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More extensive NDAs sometime include obligations on the buyer
to consult with the seller before disclosing information to the
extent required by law/regulatory bodies. This is not necessarily
an unreasonable principle provided that the consultation itself
is not prohibited by law. An obvious example here is the The Proceeds
of Crime Act where disclosing an actual or prospective notification
to SOCA (formerly NCIS) can itself constitute the offence of tipping
off.
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Buyers should look very carefully at the practical obligations
imposed on them to protect and preserve confidential information.
Ideally buyers should accept no more than “reasonable endeavours”
to avoid liability for breaches out of its control such as fire,
theft etc.
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Buyers should also seek to include a contractual time limit on
their confidentiality obligations. The absence of a time limit will
not make the NDA unenforceable but in practice most buyers would
prefer to have the certainty of knowing when their obligations expire.
Active buyers and investors could well have signed a considerable
number of NDAs and in terms of managing their unknown liability
time limits is an important benefit.
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Buyers should always resist giving an indemnity against breach
of the NDA. For the seller, claims under indemnities are clearly
easier as there is no requirement for the sellers to mitigate their
loss and the loss recoverable under an indemnity may be greater
than damages. From a buyer’s perspective common law remedies
of damages and/or an injunction are sufficient without giving the
seller the additional protection of an indemnity.
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Seller drafted NDAs often include clauses purporting to state
that an injunction is an appropriate remedy for a breach of the
NDA. These clauses are of persuasive value only as an injunction
is an equitable remedy and a court will not feel constrained or
obliged to grant an injunction simply because of a provision of
the NDA.
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It is a standard clause in NDAs that a buyer can be required to
return documents it holds containing confidential information, whether
these are documents supplied by the sellers or copies the Buyer
has made. Difficult issues arise where confidential information
has been incorporated into electronic records or now forms a part
of a wider report, analysis etc prepared by the buyer. Buyers should
not resist returning documents supplied by sellers and any copies
but they should resist the return or destruction of reports/analyses
generated by the buyer on the basis that this is “secondary
information” and that the ongoing confidentiality obligations
would continue in relation to secondary information. Buyers in regulated
sectors should consider whether the obligation to return/destroy
should be subject to ongoing legal/regulatory obligations.
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It is becoming more common for NDAs to include non-solicitation
provisions, whether of employees, customers or suppliers. Again
these clauses are potentially restraints of trade and will be unenforceable
if they go wider than is reasonably necessary to protect the interests
of the seller. In relation to employees this means that the restriction
must be limited only to key employees. Ideally from the buyer’s
perspective the definition of key employees should be as precise
as possible, preferably identification by job title. Non-solicitation
of employees will need to be limited in time and the buyer should
also provide itself with an exclusion for general recruitment advertising
(though it is probably reasonable not to offer a job to a key employee
who responds to a general advert).
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Buyers will need to carefully consider other forms of non-solicitation
such as non-solicitation of customers or suppliers. In most normal
deals such non-solicitation clauses will be inappropriate and unacceptable
to the buyers. Indeed if the identity of the customer is so important
it is probably more appropriate for sellers to refuse to disclose
the identity of key customers until much later in the sale process.
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Buyers should not enter into NDAs lightly. Disclosure or misuse
of confidential information can result in a detrimental effect to
the goodwill of the seller or the target business which in itself
could result in sizeable damages. Of course litigation is inherently
uncertain and it will be for the seller to prove breach of a confidentiality
undertaking but in view of the potential sizeable damages buyers
should be very careful first to limit the extent of their obligations
and secondly to have procedures in place to ensure compliance. It
cannot be ignored that for regular purchasers of businesses or regular
investors a reputation for breaching NDAs would be very damaging.
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NDAs in the context of an auction process sometimes seek to give
the ultimately successful bidder the right to enforce the NDA. Buyers
need to think carefully about such third party rights as the attitude
of the ultimately successful bidder (who might be a trade competitor)
might be quite different from the seller.
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Lastly, UK based buyers should ensure that the NDA is governed
by English law and that the courts of England and Wales have exclusive
jurisdiction. Without these provisions a buyer would need to be
alive to issues under the laws of any other jurisdiction, such as
those where the seller or target is based, which might affect the
underlying principles under which the buyer enters into the NDAs.